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A survey of the key arguments that have been developed for and against the rationality of 
belief in reincarnation shows that often the central dispute is not over what the ‘data’ are but 
how to assess the ‘data’ from specific metaphysical-hermeneutical horizons. By examining 
some of these arguments formulated by Hindu thinkers as well as their critiques – from the 
perspectives of metaphysical naturalism and Christian theology – we argue that one of the 
reasons why these debates remain intractable is that the ‘theory’ is underdetermined by the 
‘data’, so that more than one set of the latter can be regarded as adequate explanations of the 
former.  
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A survey of the arguments for and against the doctrines of karma and reincarnation, as they 
are understood across the Hindu traditions, would reveal that the proponents and the critics 
often disagree not so much over what the ‘evidence’ is, but how to incorporate it within their 
wider conceptual horizons. As we will see in this essay, while one group would regard the 
absence of a certain kind of ‘data’ as falsifying the doctrines, this evidential gap would not be 
viewed by the other as a major epistemic defect. Therefore, one of the reasons why debates 
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for and against the ‘rationality’ of these doctrines continue to be intractable is, to use the 
vocabulary of philosophy of science, that the theory is underdetermined by the data, so that 
there are alternative theoretical frameworks that ‘fit’ the same set of data. 
We will explore the question of the rationality of belief in reincarnation through a discussion 
of the meta-epistemological theme of what makes it rational to give assent to a proposition. 
Without attempting a full-scale analysis of this topic here, we lay out some of the key aspects 
of the role of rationality in the formation and the regulation of beliefs. Minimally, individuals 
are rational when they do not violate certain logical principles (primarily the ‘law’ of non-
contradiction) and try to fulfill their epistemic responsibilities to seek truth, while maximally 
individuals are rational only when these responsibilities are successfully discharged.
1
 
According to the minimalist account, then, any belief will count as rational provided it is non-
contradictory and empirical support for it is being sought, while according to the maximalist 
account, our beliefs are rational only if their truth-status has been validated through formal 
procedures. A common objection against the former is that it labels as rational all kinds of 
beliefs that we might wish to keep out, while the latter is often criticized for projecting too 
idealized a picture of rationality that ignores the context-specific ways in which human 
beings form their beliefs in concrete locations.
2
 An intermediate position is what some 
philosophers in the wake of Thomas Kuhn have labelled social evidentialism. According to 
this standpoint, human beings should be viewed not as singular epistemic subjects who 
incrementally build up their picture of the world from perspicaciously clear axioms, but 
rather as socialized into a community of epistemic peers from which they learn the rules of 
collecting, analyzing, and assessing evidence.
3
 Since the canonical rules through which we 
seek evidential grounding for our beliefs are inter-woven with our overarching worldviews, 
we do not (yet) have access to a God’s-eye point of view from which the rationality or the 
epistemic merits of our conceptual systems can be decisively settled at one stroke. Thus, for 
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instance, while both Christians and non-Christians have been reading the synoptic Gospels 
for roughly two millennia now, they arrive at different conclusions over the possibility of the 
resurrection of Christ not because they have access to different sets of data (they read roughly 
the same texts, and sometimes in the original languages) but because they disagree over how 
to read, assess, and evaluate the data. 
 
The meta-epistemological thesis of hermeneutic perspectivism indicated here – that the 
patterns of formation and regulation of belief are informed by distinct perspectives – also 
helps us to understand why debates over the rationality of belief in reincarnation remain 
inconclusive, in spite of various arguments launched for and against it over the last two 
hundred years or so. By surveying the arguments from a range of figures, we shall argue that 
the fundamental debate across these figures is primarily over how to assess the ‘evidence’ 
that is broadly accepted by all of them. Since the ‘evidence’ is accessible from distinct 
hermeneutical horizons so that more than one theoretical framework – for instance, 
metaphysical naturalism, Vedāntic Hinduism, and Christian theology – can assimilate it 
through explanatory chains, these figures arrive at opposite conclusions. As debates in 
philosophy of science over the underdetermination of theory by data have indicated, when 
two or more theories are ‘empirically equivalent’, in the sense that the available data are 
consistent with these theories, there is no knockdown confirmation or falsification of these 
theories.
14
 If empirical evidence seems to disconfirm a theoretical framework, the apparent 
disconfirmation can be rebutted by altering certain aspects of this conceptual structure. 
According to this notion of ‘holist underdetermination’, often labelled the Duhem-Quine 
thesis, hypotheses must be tested as a group, so that in case of a failed empirical test, it is not 
immediately obvious which of these hypotheses should be abandoned or revised. That is, the 
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epistemic support provided by ‘data’ to ‘theory’ is built out of inductive nests of evidence. In 
a more formulaic manner, the thesis can be set out as follows: 
 
If (theory and background assumptions), then Prediction. 
Not-Prediction. 
Therefore, Not-(theory and background assumptions).  
Therefore, Not-theory or Not-background assumptions. 
 
Consequently, the potential defeaters of a theory can be rebutted by pointing out that they are 
grounded in metaphysical perspectives or background assumptions that are distinct from 
those of the theory itself. Thus J. Prabhu argues that the reason why reincarnation research 
has not been accepted by the scientific community is because the latter’s horizons are 
structured by physical naturalism: ‘This is only to be expected, because a reincarnation 
hypothesis goes against the beliefs of many reared in a materialist or physicalist culture. 
Within these assumptions, the scope of observation, experiment and reality-testing is going to 
be restricted, while the limited data uncovered by these methods in turn reinforces these 
narrow assumptions. This problem of the theory-ladenness of all data and of what counts as 
evidence is well known from discussions in contemporary philosophy and history of 
science’.15 For another example of how ‘background assumptions’ can shape the debate over 
the rationality of reincarnation, we can turn to Robert Almeder who notes that ‘dogmatic anti-
Cartesians’, who understand personal identity exhaustively in terms of bodily continuity and 
accept physicalist theories of mind, will not accept any evidence as supporting the possibility 
of post mortem survival.
16
 That is, some form of Cartesianism or anti-Cartesianism, 
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whichever we take to be a better explication of our intuitions about personal identity, is 
related in a ‘holistic’ manner to our beliefs about the cognitive integrity or inadequacy of the 
theory of reincarnation. 
 
The Underdetermination Thesis Applied to Reincarnation 
 
A striking feature of the rich traditions of intellectual inquiry in classical Indian thought is the 
absence of sustained dialectical argumentation about the plausibility or verifiability of the 
doctrines of karma and reincarnation. Various soteriological systems such as Vedānta (itself 
comprising several theistic and trans-theistic strands), Buddhism, Jainism, and others 
accepted the karmic structuring of human experience, and minutely examined the nature of 
the self.  Thus the Vedāntic Hindu systems  argue that there is a spiritual core that is re-
incarnated across numerous life-times till this core attains liberation as it is understood within 
their specific horizons, while the Buddhist metaphysics of impermanence rejects the notion of 
a spiritual essence and instead speaks of the rebirths of psychic continua. Notwithstanding 
this divergence over what is involved in the karmic processes, none of these groups denied 
the reality of these transmissions across lives. The belief in the karmic configurations of 
reality operated on these horizons as a ‘framework’ assumption that ties together the threads 
of theological anthropology, religious epistemology, and soteriology in overlapping networks 
of meaning. According to most of their traditional sources, an individual does not work one’s 
way to the belief through a piecemeal accumulation of evidence that is subjected to rigorous 
processes of empirical verification or falsification. Rather the acceptance, initially on trust 
(śraddhā), of the veridicality of the meta-empirical perception of the sages such as the 
Buddha, leads the individual who has undergone spiritual regeneration to see the world in the 
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light of this belief.
17
 While the Buddha claims at various places in the Pali Canon the ability 
to recall past lives,
18
 the Yoga texts state that the yogi can gain knowledge of previous births 
(Yogasūtras III.18).19 From the perspective of Advaita Vedānta, A. Sharma similarly argues 
that while empirically we often observe that the virtuous suffer and the wicked prosper, from 
the vantage-point of ultimate reality the truth is that ‘such injustice is only apparent and not 
real – that ultimately appearances notwithstanding, cosmic justice prevails’.20  That is, belief 
in the karmic regulation of human existence is inter-subjectively rational for those who have 
access to the texts, traditions, and teachers of the Hindu and the Buddhist life-worlds. This 
hermeneutic perspectivism is reflected, for instance, by the claim in the Manusmṛti (c. 200 
CE): ‘By reciting the Vedas constantly, by performing purifications, by engaging in ascetic 
toil, and by showing no hostility to any creature, he gets to remember his former birth’.21      
 
Before we proceed, we need to spell out some of the aspects of the doctrines of karma and 
reincarnation as they appear specifically in Hindu conceptual systems. In their minimalist 
form, the doctrines state that human actions leave behind a certain potency which leads an 
individual to experience happiness or suffering in future embodiments.
22
 These actions leave 
behind certain impressions or form tendencies, which somehow shape the future locations of 
the transmigrating spiritual self.
23
 The medieval text Bhāgavata-Purāṇa (c. 1000 CE) 
expresses the doctrines in a terse manner: the same individual enjoys the fruits of the same 
meritorious or demeritorious act in the next world in the same manner and to the same extent 
according to the manner and the extent to which that act  has been performed in this world.
24
 
A crucial implication that modern Hindu figures have often drawn from these doctrines is that 
human beings should work through their present lives keeping in mind that although ‘we may 
wait a long time before we reap any harvest, yet we must know that there can be no loss and 
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unfair return. What we deserve is bound to come to us; and what we do not deserve, even if 
we try to gain it by some crooked way, will not stay with us’.25 We will discuss three cases 
where the arguments for or against the coherence of these doctrines are informed at a crucial 
juncture either by the disputant’s location on the Hindu conceptual horizons or by the 
disputant’s rejection of these perspectives. 
 
 
 
 
Memory Recall and Reincarnation  
 
First, consider the so-called memory objection to the belief in reincarnation, namely, that 
because we do not recall our (putative) past lives, the belief is irrational. As various figures 
have pointed out, just as we do not claim that our childhood is non-existent simply because 
we do not remember (some of) our experiences from that stage of our lives, the possibility of 
past lives cannot be discounted merely by noting that we do not have any memories relating 
to them. For instance, we may regard memory in dispositional terms as the ability to recall 
certain events which we do not at present consciously remember, and the doctrines of karma 
and reincarnation too speak of dispositions carried across lives which may be activated at a 
later stage.
26
 Indeed, the inability to remember past lives is often viewed by Hindu figures not 
as an objection to but as a support for belief in reincarnation. Thus Swami Paramananda 
argues that there is a ‘great blessing in this forgetfulness, for sometimes our past recollections 
prove to be most fatal to our progress. They hang over us like dark clouds overshadowing our 
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destiny’.27 There is, however, a crucial dis-analogy: in the case of our childhood, we can turn 
to our parents and relatives who, independently of their religious horizons, will inform us that 
we indeed existed as children, whereas in the case of reincarnation, we have to appeal to the 
enlightened sages such as the Buddha or the Hindu yogis. Therefore, the metaphysical 
possibility of the continued existence of an incorporeal self across life-times  must be settled 
before (the priority is logical and not temporal) we begin to assess the evidence for 
reincarnation. However, if this metaphysical possibility can be established on independent 
grounds, it would enhance the plausibility of the theory of reincarnation, even if we cannot 
delineate the precise mechanisms of reincarnation. In a  broadly neo-Vedantic argument in An 
Idealist View of Life, supplemented with references to Plato, Plotinus, and Kant, and 
Whitehead, S. Radhakrishnan rejects a psycho-neural identity theory by claiming that we 
should not confuse an empirical conjunction between a physical brain and cognitive 
processes with a metaphysical necessity. While we may need brains to think when we are 
embodied, we should not conclude, according to him, that disembodied thought is 
metaphysically impossible.
29
 Thus, having proposed the coherence of the concept of a self 
that precedes this life and moves on to other bodies after death, Radhakrishnan argues that 
‘[t]he metaphysical question of the continuity of the self is not in any way affected by the 
discontinuity of memory’.30 That is, Radhakrishnan, whose overall argument in An Idealist 
View of Life, is the metaphysical reality of the dimension of the Spirit which is working in 
and through matter, does not view the absence of memory-claims as disconfirming the theory 
of reincarnation. Indeed, he believes that certain undeniable ‘facts’, such as the remarkable 
talents and abilities of child prodigies, lend support to the theory, even though we do not have 
a clear understanding of the processes.
31
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We will note in a subsequent section that Ian Stevenson and his associates have documented 
cases of children who have reported memories from (putative) previous lives, and argued that 
such memory-claims are good empirical evidence for reincarnation. For now, consider, in 
contrast, W. Kaufman’s response to a view similar to that of Radhakrishnan developed more 
recently by M. Chadha and N. Trakakis. Kaufman objects that because of the absence of 
memory-claims the believer in reincarnation is not able to provide any correlations at all 
between evil acts in the past and sufferings in the present. He presents their second reply to 
his original article in this manner: ‘the dogmatic insistence that one should simply have faith: 
karma tells us that our present sufferings are correlated with past deeds, and that’s the end of 
the discussion. It should suffice that one knows one is being punished for an unspecified 
wrong committed at an unspecified past time and place because that is what karma says’.32 
Indeed, this is precisely the point that Chadha and Trakakis acknowledge: ‘The theory of 
karma says nothing specific about when and in what form the rewards and punishments will 
be meted out; it only states that an agent is bound to enjoy or suffer the results of their 
behaviour – if not in this life, then at least in some future life’.33 An individual who has 
developed a form of yogic insight into past lives would indeed be able to ‘see’ these karmic 
connections by activating latent memories relating to these lives, and understand how one’s 
sufferings fit into the chain of one’s karmic consequentiality.  However, given that in the 
present such connections are not perceived, the vital question is: in the absence of such 
empirical correlations, why believe in the reality of the processes of reincarnation?  
 
R. Perrett provides a helpful analogy: if a motorist were to kill a pedestrian and then incur 
amnesia, we do not argue that the individual’s responsibility for the death is diminished 
merely by the loss of memory, for all that is needed on the part of the individual is the belief 
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that he or she was responsible for this accident.
34
 Likewise, even if a specific individual is not 
herself able to trace her previous lives back into the past, she might accept the testimony of 
the enlightened sages that the world is indeed structured by karmic regulations. Stephen 
Phillips has recently developed a version of this argument through an appeal to yogic 
perception as a means of knowledge. He develops a parallelism thesis: just as sense 
perception has epistemic value in its ordinary operations, yogic perception too can reveal to 
us features of reality. Only the yogis have the authority to makes claims about trans-empirical 
reality, and the others, who should not dispute the veridicality of yogic perception unless they 
have specific reasons to doubt it, have to depend on their testimony. Phillips emphasises the 
fallibilist nature of this appeal to yogic testimony: the parallelism thesis does not imply the 
truth of yogic claims, for all claims are corrigible. However, we should ‘assume that 
meditation and other yogic experience has a noetic or cognitive quality, being both taken as 
informative about some pretty important matters, such as the death-spanning nature of our 
consciousness, and informative in fact. There is no general reason we should not trust our 
teacher’s testimony’.35 In short, just as sense perception usually generates knowledge, even 
though there are cases (such as when we suffer from astigmatic vision) when they lead us 
astray, yogic perception too is ‘trustworthy by default’, even though it is defeasible.  
 
Post Mortem Existence and Reincarnation  
 
Second, a vital point of contention relates to the plausibility of certain forms of substantial 
mind-body dualism. For Vedāntic Hindu thinkers, the rationality of the doctrines of karma 
and reincarnation is underpinned by the Upaniṣadic declarations about the immortal spiritual 
essence of the human person that is distinct from the mutable corporeal structure. Therefore, 
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death is viewed, on Vedāntic metaphysical horizons, not as a unique event in the life of an 
individual but as a transition of the unitary self’s assumption of a new set of bodily 
conditions. In the light of this philosophical-hermeneutical backdrop, Radhakrishnan argues 
that psychical research provides some support to the theory of an ethereal body. He notes that 
classical Hindu texts speak of the subtle body which survives the dissolution of the gross 
body, and which acts as the carrier of an individual’s karmic dispositions, tendencies, and 
traits across lives. Given these metaphysical presuppositions, he concludes that when due 
allowance is made for the possibilities of fraud, error, and coincidences, there is ‘enough 
evidence to justify the belief that apparitions are due to the action of the dead persons whose 
bodies they represent’.37  
 
In contrast, Paul Edwards, who rejects substantial dualism and accepts a form of psycho-
neural identity in the philosophy of mind, argues that people who believe in reincarnation 
suffer from deep cognitive inadequacies. The theory is not based on any observational 
evidence and seeks to exploit gaps in the scientific explanations for phenomena such as child 
prodigies, the experience of déjà vu, and so on. One of his primary objections is that believers 
in reincarnation are unable to state the mechanics of a reincarnating self, so that they are led 
to ‘absurdities’ about the astral bodies of the departed in the interregnum between two 
embodiments.
38
 Radhakrishnan himself addressed this issue, and acknowledged the difficulty 
of spelling out the mechanism through which the self finds a new embodiment. However, he 
arrived at a diametrically opposed conclusion that we noted earlier: ‘The mechanism of 
rebirth is difficult to know … But simply because we do not understand the process we 
cannot deny the facts’.39 Providing some metaphorical elaboration, he argued that we may 
view the self as moving with the ‘finer vehicle’ of the subtle body, which attracts to itself the 
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physical elements that form the gross body. Through this ‘psychic gravitation’ the self finds 
its appropriate environment. The ‘deciding factor’ in this process is the self, which is reborn 
in certain families which embody the qualities that the self seeks to develop, and not the 
parents of the body.
40
 We see that while Edwards argues that the empirical unavailability of 
‘facts’ relating to the interregnum between two lives demonstrates the cognitive inadequacy 
of the theory of reincarnation, Radhakrishnan claims that this empirical inaccessibility does 
not violate the theory’s cognitive integrity. Phillips addresses these conceptual gaps from a 
slightly different angle by taking up one of Edwards’ objections – the doctrines of karma and 
reincarnation cannot explain the increase in the human population. Phillips replies that 
regarding the question of where the extra selves come from, we may argue ‘that the other 
world or worlds, or, as in Vedanta, planes of being, in which we live, have the resources, and 
we do not presume to know the details. All Yoga theories of reincarnation assert an other-
worlds hypothesis, and we have no extraterrestrial population counts’.41 Once again, Phillips, 
who shares with Radhakrishnan a metaphysical horizon of empirical selves progressing or 
regressing through cycles of reincarnation, does not view the lack of precise details of these 
karmic processes as undermining the cognitive adequacy of the theory of reincarnation.  
 
Universal Justice and Reincarnation  
 
The arguments from the above two sections can be summarised in the following manner. For 
Hindu believers in karma who accept that reincarnation takes place, the key challenge is to 
explain the how of reincarnation.
42
 Now from the premise that there are no memories relating 
to (putative) previous lives, critics of the doctrine conclude that this lack shows that there are 
no karmic processes regulating multiple lives, while its defenders conclude that the relevant 
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memories can be activated in appropriate circumstances.  The disputes between defenders 
and critics of the theory of reincarnation can be traced back to their divergent metaphysical 
horizons: the former sometimes accept some form of metaphysical naturalism, and the latter a 
version of body and spirit distinction grounded in Upaniṣadic texts or Yoga-related 
cosmologies. For a third instance of a divergence that is informed by different metaphysical 
perspectives, let us turn to the moral arguments that have been developed in defence of karma 
and reincarnation.  
 
A common argument is that the doctrines of karma and reincarnation help to make sense of 
the various forms of inequality that we see in the world, and also show people the way to 
overcome their numerous ills and ultimately gain liberation. Indeed, the doctrines can provide 
us deep consolation by reminding us that our present sufferings are not inflicted upon us 
arbitrarily but are the fulfillment of ‘just laws’.43 All individuals must receive adequate 
opportunities to overcome the impediments which are structured by their karmic inheritances, 
a perfection which cannot always be completed within the space of a single lifetime.
44
 
Therefore, there can be no eternal perdition: since action and reaction must be equal, there 
cannot be infinite punishments for finite human errors. As Swami Paramananda puts it: 
‘Could an all-wise, all-loving Providence condemn any child of His to everlasting suffering? 
He grants us another life, another opportunity, another advantage, that we may still prove our 
worth and work out our salvation’.45 Further, the doctrines have a ‘scientific’ foundation in 
that they are said to be simply an extension to the spiritual planes of the natural causation that 
scientists accept in their dealings with physical reality.
46
 Just as the Newtonian law of 
gravitational attraction applies objectively to all natural entities, we may speak, according to 
figures such as Swami Paramananda, of moral causation that connects, at the spiritual level, 
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empirical selves on their journey towards the transcendent. In other words, ewe can consider 
the principle of karma as the ‘moral law’ of cause and effect which applies the principle of 
natural causation to the moral and spiritual spheres, so that one’s moral nature is shaped by 
one’s own actions and not by fate or chance. Since natural causation is ‘enfolded’ in this 
manner by moral causation, the invocation of karmic explanations is meant not to deny 
natural chains of causality but to make sense of why some evil befalls this and not that 
person.  
 
Modern Hindu commentators on the doctrines of karma and reincarnation often present them 
with the ‘evolutionary’ vocabulary of a self which has a karmic history as well as a future 
that the self is now shaping through its actions.  According to Sri Aurobindo, karma shapes 
‘the whole nature and eventuality of these repeated existences. There is nothing here to 
depreciate the importance of the present life. On the contrary the doctrine gives it immense 
vistas and enormously enhances the value of effort and action’.47 Echoing these themes, 
Radhakrishnan argues that if human souls are created by God with varied natures, human 
existence would be structured by ‘caprice and cruelty’. The God who places human beings in 
diverse circumstances and judges them depending on their ability to negotiate these 
circumstances is ‘a strangely whimsical deity who enjoys our adventures’.48 Instead, the 
doctrines of karma and reincarnation state that the fulfilment of human individuality involves 
not ‘blind rushes to the goal’ but a gradual perfectionism that can require a thousand years or 
more.
49
 In a more recent elaboration of this argument, J. Prabhu states that the body is the 
externalisation of the self (ātman), and the moral stage where the self, in association with the 
moral and psychological dispositions of the individual, undergoes its spiritual evolution. He 
notes that his primary emphasis is on the moral significance of reincarnation and not the 
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empirical evidence, and calls his argument a Kantian ‘transcendental deduction based on a 
phenomenological analysis of our moral experience’.50 Pointing out that we sometimes 
encounter in ourselves a skill that we cannot explain by our prior experiences, he argues that 
while this ‘evidence’ does not necessarily lead to the doctrines of karma and reincarnation, 
the belief in a previous life ‘is a reasonable one, especially when placed in the context of a 
more comprehensive belief in a moral universe. There is then no bitterness about life, but 
rather a calm acceptance of what it has to offer, of joy or of sorrow, aware that both are given 
us to draw the soul upwards toward God’.51 Therefore, the principle of karma is not primarily 
retributive but one of continuity and spiritual growth through which an individual moves 
away from ignorance about the nature of reality. 
 
Once again, to see that the conclusion for karma and reincarnation does not follow with 
deductive necessity from these considerations about cosmic justice and moral progress, we 
may consider a Christian theological reflection on the problem of evil. A.G. Hogg (who was 
one of Radhakrishnan’s teachers at Madras Christian College) put forward the following 
contrast between Hindu and Christian approaches to the question of reconciling ‘unmerited’ 
suffering with belief in a benevolent creator. Both views agree, he noted, that there is 
ultimately no problem in this matter, but the former believes this to be the case on the basis of 
the law of karma and reincarnation, while the latter claims that ‘it is right that there should be 
undeserved suffering.’52 Hogg sought to defend the Christian position, firstly, by arguing that 
in a world that runs, under divine providence, in accordance with natural laws, there will be 
instances when certain actions of human beings lead to the (undeserved) suffering of their 
fellow-creatures, and, secondly, that it is only when the crucified Christ meets us that we 
become aware that we share a common humanity so that through a radical metanoia we begin 
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to renounce the self-centredness that leads us to seek our personal good. Christ’s redeeming 
love produces in the heart the realisation that all human beings are mutually implicated in one 
another’s sinful actions so that oftentimes the innocent suffer with the guilty. Though the 
New Testament does provide some response to the question of suffering, believing that it is 
caused by sin, Christian theologians have not developed, according to Hogg, any systematic 
theory for the question of the ‘distribution of suffering’ among human beings. The ultimate 
reason for this, Hogg believed, is the conviction that in the midst of all worldly travails 
Christ, who suffered more than anyone else, is present to those who are in agony, and that as 
the loving God he did not want to remain extraneous to their struggles on earth.
53
 
 
For another specific example of how it is possible to re-articulate a similar aggregate of data 
from a divergent theological perspective, we may turn to the following argument developed 
by Phillips to defend the possibility of reincarnation.  
 
1. If God is X (Brahman, or omnibenevolent and so on), then life would be meaningful. 
2. Life would not be meaningful without enduring individuality. 
3. Enduring individuality in our world needs the mechanism of reincarnation. 
4. God is X. 
Therefore, reincarnation is real.
54
  
 
The key premise here is the third. A Roman Catholic theologian such as J. DiNoia could 
accept the first, the second, and the fourth, replace ‘reincarnation’ with ‘purgatory in another 
world’ in the third, and arrive at the conclusion: ‘Therefore, purgatory is real’.55 
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Consequently, the key question is why from a Hindu perspective one accepts the possibility 
of reincarnation and not, say, the Christian doctrine of the atonement or purgatory, and 
classically the answer has been that it is reincarnation, and not the latter, that the enlightened 
sages have claimed to be the truth about the nature of reality.  
Cosmic Necessity and Reincarnation  
 
A crucial debate internal to the Hindu traditions relates to whether karmic processes operate 
through a form of iron-like necessity or whether they can be suspended through divine help. 
For an instance of the former view, we may turn to the  twelfth-century Nyāya philosopher 
Udayana who states that even the Lord cannot go against the operation of the karmas of 
individuals.
57
 Several modern Hindu figures, pursuing this line, have rejected certain 
‘vicarious’ accounts of the Christian doctrine of the atonement. Regarding the view that 
Christ had redeemed the world through his sacrificial death, Gandhi wrote that while 
metaphorically there might be some truth in it, he was not willing to accept it as literally 
true.
58
 As he explained: ‘I do not believe in the doctrine of appropriation of another’s merit. 
His sacrifice is a type and an example for us’.59 Therefore, according to Gandhi Jesus 
‘atoned’ for the sins of humanity in the sense that he was an example for those who accepted 
his teachings, and who had to try to improve themselves.
60
 
 
However, several theistic strands, epic narratives, and ritual practices of the Hindu universes 
often speak in terms of karmic transfers across individuals, and between individuals and the 
personal Lord. First, people can, according to the Mahābhārata, wash away sins (pāpa) 
through austerities, sacrifices, and gifts, provided these are not committed again.
61
 The 
Garuḍa-Purāṇa notes a second mechanism for karmic annulment: even if the evil deeds of a 
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person are as massive as the mountains, these are destroyed entirely by remembering Viṣṇu.62 
In some of the streams of Hindu devotionalism, it is the grace (prasāda) of the Lord Viṣṇu 
that is the sole means of liberation from the world. All that is required on the part of the self 
is that the self does not prevent the liberation that the Lord offers through the divine 
initiative, and that the self makes the request for liberation.
63
 Third, an important aspect of 
traditional Hindu ritualism is certain kinds of penances (prāyaścitta) such as Vedic recitation 
which are said to cleanse particular kinds of sin (pāpa).64 Fourth, occasionally heroic 
individuals in the mythic narratives can transfer their own karmic ‘merits’ to others. Thus in 
the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa, the king Hariścandra tells the god Indra that he will not go to 
heaven (svarga) unless the inhabitants of his city, who have incurred various types of sins, 
also proceed there. He tells Indra that whatever are his merits through alms, sacrifices, and 
prayers should be common to him and to his citizens. Thereafter, all the people with their 
children, servants, and wives ascend to heaven along with the king.
65
  
 
The implications of this intra-Hindu dispute for our wider theme of the rationality of belief in 
reincarnation relate to the claim that the doctrines of karma and reincarnation fail, in fact, to 
account for empirical inequalities since the promised ‘explanation’ never arrives. As John 
Hick put it: ‘For we are no nearer to an ultimate explanation of the circumstances of our 
present birth when we are told that they are consequences of a previous life if that previous 
life has in turn to be explained by reference to a yet previous life, and that by reference to 
another, and so on in an infinite regress … The solution has not been produced but only 
postponed to infinity’.66 In response to Hick, Perrett argues that the infinite regress that Hick 
claims to have detected is not vicious, because each occurrence of suffering is in principle 
causally explicable in terms of the prior deeds of the sufferer.
67
 However, the notion of 
karmic transfer, suspension, or annulment elaborated in the Hindu theistic traditions is in 
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tension with the view (accepted across large stretches of the Hindu universes) that each 
individual necessarily has to work out their karmic merits and demerits through  distinct life-
trajectories, so that the sufferings of each individual are causally related only to their prior 
embodiments. 
The Varieties of Religious Rationality  
 
From our discussion in the preceding sections, we can see that while both groups of 
disputants grapple with various layers of ‘evidence’, they draw somewhat opposed 
conclusions, depending on their divergent locations on distinct metaphysical-hermeneutical 
horizons. A fundamental problem with viewing moral causation along the lines of universal 
natural causation is that the latter states that an action has certain consequences simply 
because the action has been performed, irrespective of the intention of the agent or the moral 
quality of the action. Further, while natural causation applies to two events that are 
temporally conjoined, the ‘law’ of karma states that the consequences sometimes appear in 
the distant future.
68
 Because of complexities such as these, Chadha and Trakakis argue that 
the karma theory is not put forward as ‘a complete and systematic explanation of human 
suffering’.69 Various commentators have therefore noted that the belief in reincarnation might 
gain support from evidence but is not ‘grounded’ on such evidence. Developing this anti-
evidentialist stance, A.R. Wadia states bluntly that the ‘doctrine of karma and reincarnation 
has to be accepted as a dogma which has not been proved and cannot be proved. But it does 
not follow that it is necessarily irrational. On the contrary, there is a core of rationality in the 
doctrine … There is the basic argument that a man [sic] is born into the world he has made’.70 
More recently, A. Sharma has similarly argued that ‘while it might not be possible to prove 
the doctrine [of karma and reincarnation] with absolute certainty, it seems to be equally the 
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case that the doctrine cannot with absolute certainty be established as demonstrably false. As 
in the case of the existence of God it seems to be a doctrine about which reasonable persons 
might reasonably differ’.71 Similarly, Y. Krishan argues that the doctrine of karma is not like 
a law of the physical sciences which can be experimentally proved, for the doctrine is 
proposed as an inference to explain various kinds of inequalities and diversities.
72
 
 
The basic thesis of Wadia, Sharma, and Krishan, which can be read as expressions of the 
meta-epistemological standpoint of hermeneutic perspectivism, has also been articulated by 
M. Burley who argues that the belief in retributive karma is not based on empirical evidence, 
and that this belief has survived in numerous cultures independently of evidential grounding. 
Therefore, in response to the claim that would-be believers have an epistemic obligation to 
seek out reliable evidence before the belief can be considered rational, Burley argues that 
while this belief does play an explanatory role in the lives of many people, it is not typically 
treated by them as empirically demonstrable or falsifiable.
73
 While such evidence would 
indeed raise the epistemic status of the belief, the disagreement cannot be resolved by 
rational deliberation alone because the parties to the debate share different frameworks and 
apply different pictures.
74
 In fact, Burley claims that the disagreement can be resolved only 
through an experience similar to a religious conversion, that is, only ‘by one or other party in 
the debate undergoing a change of perspective so transformative that it would amount to a 
change in form of life’.75   
 
The above discussion therefore yields a set of three positions on a fine-grained continuum 
regarding the rationality of belief in reincarnation. 
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Weak Rationality: The belief in reincarnation is rational, because any belief which is not 
logically contradictory is rational, and there is no intrinsic contradiction in the belief in 
reincarnation. 
Moderate Rationality: The belief in reincarnation is inter-subjectively rational, because the 
belief can be verified by every individual, in principle, through their progressive immersion 
in the external circuitry of Hindu texts, teachers, and traditions. 
Strong Rationality: The belief in reincarnation is rational because the belief is true. 
 
We can see, in the light of our discussion, that Phillips, Wadia, Prabhu, Krishan, Sharma, and 
Burley are claiming, in effect, that the belief in reincarnation is rational not in the sense of 
‘strong rationality’ but in that of ‘moderate rationality’. For Radhakrishnan and others, who 
already occupy a specific Hindu horizon, the belief that rebirth takes place is not rendered 
irrational by their inability to explain how it takes place. For Edwards and Kaufman, in 
contrast, who do not indwell Hindu life-worlds, the absence of observable evidence is 
precisely one of the frayed threads in the web of beliefs centred around reincarnation. We 
have noted that karmic causation, in the view of its defenders, undergirds a sort of 
metaphysical explanation for the various forms of suffering and inequalities for which 
scientific explanations are not available.
76
 The opponents of such causation could, of course, 
either claim that the required scientific explanations are indeed available, or while 
acknowledging their lack argue that an alternative metaphysical explanation (such as the 
Christian doctrine of the atonement) is more adequate to these empirical facts of suffering. 
For an example of how the first move is available to its critics, consider the well-known 
researches of Ian Stevenson who gathered his information from children between the ages of 
two and four who displayed skills, unusual abilities, and phobias which could not be 
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explained in terms of their environment. One kind of cases that he investigated related to 
children with birthmarks and birth defects that seemed to resemble wounds, often fatal, that 
were suffered by deceased persons that the children claimed to remember. Stevenson 
searched out police records, wherever possible, to verify whether the birthmarks matched the 
wounds the deceased individual had received.
77
 In an interview in 1974 he concluded that for 
at least some of the cases he had examined reincarnation was ‘the best explanation that we 
have been able to come up with. There is an impressive body of evidence and it is getting 
stronger all the time. I think a rational person, if he wants, can believe in reincarnation on the 
basis of evidence’.78 However, his critics, who noted that his readings of the data were shaped 
by his acceptance of some form of metaphysical mind-body dualism, often claimed that the 
data could be explained more adequately in terms of false memory, cryptomnesia, telepathy, 
extrasensory perception, and so on. 
 
An important conclusion follows from this discussion: while often the Hindu apologetic 
literature portrays the Hindu belief in reincarnation (and Hindu spirituality in general) as 
rational and Christian theological frameworks as irrational, superstitious, and anti-scientific, 
this portrayal of a ‘civilizational clash’ between Hinduism and Christianity does not bear 
close scrutiny. The belief in reincarnation is densely moored in a network of metaphysical-
theological doctrines about the nature of the self, the nature of the divine, and the possibility 
of the self ‘attaining’ the divine. The crux of the matter is not the dynamics of reincarnation 
but the metaphysics through which statements about the mechanism of reincarnation are 
assessed, evaluated, and critiqued. Therefore, here as in many other debates, in the end, 
metaphysics is unavoidable in  dialogical encounters which seek to defend or refute the 
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distinctive truth-claims that are raised from within Hindu theological universes over the 
nature of the self and the nature of the ultimate reality.  
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